• Policy
  • 08.10.2026

Navigating the 2027 French elections – Campaigns, electoral systems, and power constellations

Policy Brief
Yann Wernert

Yann Wernert
Senior Policy Fellow, Jacques Delors Centre

France is heading into a pivotal election year. With a far-right candidate leading the polls, all eyes are on the presidential elections in the EU’s second largest economy and founding member state. At the end of a campaign marked by high uncertainty, winning the presidency would only be a first step: a president without a majority in the National Assembly would have limited room to govern. The legislative elections that will most probably follow will be just as decisive. Should the far right prevail, if it is to implement its programme it would also need to win a referendum that would entail sweeping changes to the French constitution and a negation of the primacy of EU law. All these elements will lead to one of four possible power constellations in France, shaping its approach to the European Union.

 

1. Introduction

France embarks on its next presidential campaign with a crowded field of contenders. At the moment, the far-right candidate Marine Le Pen is the best-placed presidential candidate and likely to make it to the run-off election round. The biggest question mark is: Who will be her contender? At the same time, presidential elections will only be a starting point. Calling and winning legislative elections will be necessary for a new president to govern France effectively. In addition, should Le Pen win the presidential elections, she will also try to push through changes to the constitution through a referendum in parallel to legislative elections. A successful referendum would allow her to put in place measures that go against the current constitutional order and will have major consequences for France and its European partners.

This Policy Brief analyses the presidential campaign and its underlying dynamics, the very likely ensuing legislative elections, and the resulting power constellations that will define French influence in the European Union by summer 2027.

2. Entering a high-stakes presidential campaign

France’s presidential elections will take place over two rounds. The two candidates with the highest share of votes nationwide in the first round compete in the subsequent run-off election. The first round of elections is scheduled for 18 April 2027, with the run-off set for 2 May 2027, just two weeks before President Emmanuel Macron’s term ends (at the latest on 14 May 2027).

2.1 Entering the electoral arena: candidates

As of September 2026, more than 30 candidates have announced their candidature or have expressed their interest in doing so. More than 20 others have hinted that they might also enter the fray. At this early stage, the best-placed candidates in the polls are Marine Le Pen from the Rassemblement National (far right), Édouard Philippe from Horizons (centre right), Jean-Luc Mélenchon from La France insoumise (far left), Raphaël Glucksmann from Place Publique (centre left), Gabriel Attal from Renaissance (centre) and Bruno Retailleau from Les Républicains (conservatives). 

To be able to run, a candidate needs the endorsement of 500 people holding an electoral mandate from across the French territory. These endorsements (parrainages) are not a high bar to pass for the main candidates but make entering the race difficult for lesser-known ones. In 2022, 12 candidates managed to get onto the ballot, with the least successful garnering 0.56% of the popular vote. Endorsements must be handed in until about five weeks before the first round of presidential elections, meaning that a final list of candidates will not be standing before March – making switches between candidates possible, even up until the last minute.

2.2 Surviving politically until the run-off elections

All the polls (as of early October 2026) are suggesting that Le Pen appears virtually certain to reach the second round, barring any major upsets. This makes the identity of her run-off opponent paramount. Narrow margins separate qualifying from non-qualifying candidates. A few percentage points can make a difference between entering the run-off election or failing to do so, and early campaign polls suggest a situation similar to that of 2017 could arise. At that time, the three competitors vying for the run-off spot against the (eventual) late frontrunner Macron achieved electoral results differing by a maximum of 1.72 percentage points. Apart from candidates’ obvious need to set out a convincing programme, respond to salient policy issues and attract public attention, two factors will prove decisive for navigating the campaign’s consolidation phase: party support (with or without primaries) and adequate campaign financing. 

Formal and “wild” primaries

One feature of the presidential campaign will be the mounting pressure to consolidate around a key figure, especially in the campaign’s later stages. Multiple candidates from the same political camp could risk a party appearing divided and diluting voter share, making it difficult for any of them to reach the run-off. Party support helps candidates stand out from the crowd, giving them an edge over independent candidates and party wild cards. Without organizational backing from a party, candidates tend to struggle to gain media visibility, achieve traction in the polls and establish credibility in the public debate.

Primaries are a well-established mechanism for selecting candidates backed by single or multiple parties. Participation typically remains open to all regular voters, though some restrict eligibility to party members. A victory or a healthy result in a primary can often produce immediate polling surges, granting winners both visibility and the legitimacy to represent their ideological camp. However, this initial momentum has frequently proven short-lived. While François Hollande’s 2011 primary victory translated into electoral success, both Benoît Hamon (2016) and Valérie Pécresse (2021) saw their post-primary polling boosts quickly fade.

A left-wing primary scheduled for October 2026 will involve only moderate-left parties, the most notable being the Parti Socialiste (PS) and Place Publique (PP). The far-left LFI was excluded, a precondition for PP to participate. The Greens (Les Écologistes) chose not to participate but indicated their openness to endorsing the primary’s winner. This primary will thus only partially consolidate the field of candidates in the left camp. For the PP’s Glucksmann, winning the primary is essential to securing backing from the PS. His main contender is Olivier Faure, the PS’s first secretary (party leader).

Notably, formal primaries are not the norm. Most candidate selection occurs through informal “wild” primaries, processes driven by polling performance. As candidates’ support stalls or erodes, they face mounting pressure to exit the race and get behind more viable alternatives. This consolidation has particular implications for the left camp. Despite his absence from the left-wing primary, Jean-Luc Mélenchon could emerge as the left’s presidential candidate if left-wing voters strategically unite behind him. This occurred in 2022 when Mélenchon, who was polling at around 10% during most of the campaign, surged to 18% in its final month, ultimately receiving around 22% of votes in the first round. However, 2027 presents a different context. Mélenchon is an even more controversial figure than in 2022, facing significant opposition from left-leaning voters and ranking among the most rejected candidates nationally. Critically, head-to-head match-ups show him decisively losing to Marine Le Pen, raising severe doubts about whether left-wing voters should consolidate around him, even if the dynamics of a wild primary might otherwise propel him to the run-off.

The centre to centre-right camp has eschewed any formal primary procedure despite repeated and ongoing appeals to organize one. This reflects candidates’ calculations: the unpopularity of President Macron makes distancing oneself critical, incentivizing candidates to emphasize specifics in their programmes rather than ideological unity. As a result, candidate consolidation will likely occur through consolidation in a wild primary among the three frontrunners Gabriel Attal, Édouard Philippe and Bruno Retailleau. Attal may have a hard time maintaining his candidacy if Philippe keeps leading in the polls, as he would risk siphoning votes away from his (centre to centre-right) political camp’s most promising candidate. The same logic is likely to apply to the conservative candidate Retailleau, who is keen on keeping his distance from Philippe and Attal, but whose candidature would risk diluting votes and enable a first-round victory for the contender he despises most, the far-left Mélenchon. 

Financing a campaign

Campaign finance rules impose strict spending caps and limit funding sources to political parties and individuals, while corporate donations are prohibited. Individuals can only donate to a very limited extent. Alongside assets owned by political parties, public funding dominates campaign resources (€66 million out of a total of €164 million in 2024). Parties are granted yearly allowances based on how well they performed in legislative elections. On top of that, after an election a candidate can claim reimbursement of their campaigning costs from the public purse as long as they appeared on the ballot. About half of their expenses are paid back if they achieve more than 5% of voter share in the first round; if not, they can only claim up to around €800,000. This means that candidates who withdraw ahead of the vote miss out on a reimbursement that might be critical for party finances. This funding policy has immediate relevance for 2027 centre-right dynamics. Gabriel Attal (Renaissance) pledged to come to an agreement with Édouard Philippe (Horizons) before the first round in order not to dilute the votes of similar electorates. While Renaissance has the financial muscle not to need public reimbursement even while spending a lot, Horizons does not.

Overview of yearly party revenues from public allowances as set by the latest decree of 2025, and net wealth, based on the latest available CNCCFP (Comptes de campagne et financement politiques) report and press release data from 2024. Parliamentary group affiliations in the European Parliament have been added for context.

 

Financial disparities have a huge effect on a candidate’s viability. Travelling across the country, organizing meetings and media events is expensive. Renaissance is much richer than Horizons and could afford to invest less time and effort in fundraising, giving an edge to its candidate Attal. Being endorsed by one of the currently wealthiest parties, the Parti Socialiste, would have significant advantages for an ideologically close candidate like Raphaël Glucksmann, whose own party Place Publique has scarce financial means. Electorally marginal but wealthy parties like the Parti Communiste Français can afford to put up a candidate and could, if they wanted, strike a bargain for their candidate to pull out ahead of the first round in exchange for political influence. The Rassemblement National faces financial constraints due to accumulated debts, even as fairly recent rising income improves its position.

Bank loans are essential for bridging the gap between campaign spending and post-election reimbursement. This creates particular challenges for the RN, as French banks are reluctant to lend due to reputational concerns. The RN relied on a Hungarian bank in 2022 and a Russian/Czech one in 2014, drawing accusations of possible foreign interference and help from illiberal or authoritarian rulers. These options are no longer available, as only banks within the European Union are now allowed to hand out loans to candidates. The Hungarian bank that was ready to grant the RN a loan in 2022 might have done so because its owner was close to Viktor Orbán, who has since been replaced. Candidates with meagre electoral prospects have a hard time securing loans, adding to the pressure to withdraw early. Discussions about the state facilitating loans have so far not seen much progress.

2.3 The run-off election: Who becomes president?

The first round on 18 April will determine the two candidates who will advance to the May run-off. Theoretically, a candidate securing more than 50% of first round votes could win outright, obviating a second round. However, this scenario has never occurred since presidents have been elected by popular vote, and current polling indicates no candidate will approach such a threshold in 2027.

Marine Le Pen holds a decisive lead, polling around 35% for the first round in October 2026, potentially the strongest performance since 1974. Dominating the first round however does not guarantee success in the run-off, because voters tend to shift towards opposing the candidate they most reject. And so, between rounds, campaign logics similarly shift. First-round campaigning emphasizes mobilizing core electorates and strengthening partisan adherence. Second-round campaigning requires broader appeals to swing voters and overcoming the opposition of less aligned voters. This creates a strategic tension: energizing core voters to reach the run-off elections alienates those moderates essential for victory. For example, Le Pen may attract sufficient voters in the first round with her outspoken anti-establishment stance but at the same time deter moderate conservatives in the run-off. Similarly, Édouard Philippe committing to stricter pension reforms may make him popular among conservatives but could lead to him being rejected by centre-left voters in the second round. Even though many voters have to make a choice between candidates they did not vote for in the first round, voter turnout during the second round is usually comparable to the first round.

Candidates face each other in a run-off TV debate, the culmination of each presidential campaign. Rhetorical acumen and well-placed barbs are often an incisive part of these campaigns as candidates vie for their message to cut through to the public. In closely tied run-off elections such as the one expected in 2027, these arguments can make all the difference.

3. Winning the presidency is not enough 

Becoming a president grants important but ultimately limited constitutionally guaranteed powers. The president is elected for five years, is nearly impossible to remove, and plays a key role in institutional processes. Most notably, he or she is free to choose the prime minister, even though in practice that person must be able to survive a vote of no-confidence in the National Assembly. This limits the president’s choice in cases where the National Assembly is not aligned with the president. The office’s potential thus only comes to fruition if it is complemented by an absolute majority in the National Assembly, though some areas remain untouched by the composition of the parliament. Notably, as commander in chief and head of the defence and security council, the president is the sole official entitled to authorize the use of nuclear weapons.

The extent to which the president is involved in day-to-day politics has varied widely throughout the Fifth Republic, ranging from inertia during cohabitation periods to “hyper-presidencies”. When the president has an aligned majority in the National Assembly, he or she can de facto govern. The choice of prime minister becomes almost irrelevant, as parliamentary backing is all but guaranteed and the president can, and will, sideline him or her. Ministers, though formally proposed by the prime minister, are in practice determined by the president. Emmanuel Macron’s first term (2017–2022) illustrates this dynamic: with a large parliamentary majority behind him, he effectively assumed the functions of head of government.

Where the National Assembly majority opposes the presidency, the president’s power is much more limited. Much of the governing power shifts to the government and prime minister who enjoy the majority’s support, even though in practice the prime minister would typically still allow the president some say over the choice of the defence and foreign affairs ministers. Cohabitation exposes the structural limits of the presidential office. It lacks significant administrative resources of its own. As only a limited number of advisors and civil servants fall under the president’s immediate authority, he or she is dependent on information and data from ministries and institutions. What remains is a form of nuisance power: the ability to interfere with, slow down, or hinder governmental affairs. This is particularly the case when it comes to countersigning adopted bills, government orders (ordonnances) and decrees (décrets), making the president an unavoidable player. During the Mitterrand-Chirac cohabitation, President Mitterrand refused to sign some ordonnances, but whether he was entitled to do so and act as a veto giver was subject to controversy and never clarified. Exercising this nuisance power extensively comes at the cost of weakening France’s ability to act. A cost a moderate president would likely deem too high, whereas a more confrontational or anti-establishment president might not. 

The constitution says nothing about presidential prerogatives on the European level. The domaine réservé, supposedly an exclusive competence for the president to decide on matters relating to foreign and defence policy, is not written into the constitution and would probably be ill-suited to justifying a president’s playing a major role on the EU stage. In theory, even the incumbent’s presence in the European Council could be challenged. In practice, president and prime minister would have to decide how to handle specific decisions on a case-by-case basis. While this implies constant and time-consuming negotiations, it could work as long as their relationship is not broken beyond repair. 

Winning a majority in the National Assembly is thus central for a president to implement the programme they ran on. 

4. Securing a majority in the National Assembly

The president may dissolve the National Assembly and call for new elections at his or her discretion once a year. Given that the current National Assembly is divided into three large political blocs, unable to provide a stable majority for any president, it is all but given that the elected president will have to call for new elections. This is possible from the very moment he or she takes office. The elections to the National Assembly take place 20 to 40 days after the announcement. Depending on the date on which the future president takes office (14 May next year at the latest) and announces the dissolution of the National Assembly, legislative elections could then take place at the beginning of June at the earliest. 

A vote occurring as soon as possible would be in the president’s interest, as it would allow him or her to profit from the momentum of electoral victory and satisfy the public’s expectations of timely action. Delaying the elections would risk pushing them to the summer break, not an ideal season for politicking, or to autumn 2027, which would interfere with the constitutionally stipulated dates for the budget approval procedure. 

4.1 How the legislative elections work

Elections to the National Assembly follow a two-round voting system, with each of the Assembly’s 577 seats tied to a constituency. There are no nationwide lists or thresholds for gaining a seat in parliament, the only requirement being to win the two rounds of voting in a particular constituency. While designed to allow for absolute majorities in a bipartisan system at the cost of broader representation, it failed to produce majorities in the most recent legislative elections. 

The first round of elections determines who will compete in the run-off that takes place a week later. Candidates getting a share of at least 12.5% of all citizens on the electoral register in the first round are represented in the run-off elections. The candidate with the most votes in the subsequent run-off is then elected. Depending on voter turnout and the concentration of votes, two to three candidates (and, more rarely, four) can make it to the run-off elections. A candidate can be elected during the first round if he or she garners more than 50% of the vote, as long as this accounts for at least 25% of citizens on the electoral register.

Coordination challenge

The system incentivizes party alliances ahead of elections. Parties can split up their candidacies, not competing against one another in the same constituency. The aim is to maximize the election chances of one’s own candidate at the expense of ideologically close ones, who in return benefit from being able to stand unopposed in another constituency. In 2024, around 50 different far-left, moderate left and green parties managed to form such an alliance, the “new popular front”, which took about three days to be negotiated and was designed to prevent the RN from attaining a majority in the National Assembly. This approach is now being tested by growing conflicts between the leftist parties.

Another type of coordination is the informal principle of the republican front (“front républicain”), stipulating that all but the best-placed candidate in the run-off election would agree to step down when facing a far-right contender in order to exclude the latter from gaining political power. The previous success of this principle has been watered down in recent years, but still enjoys significant support and achieved its goal during the 2024 elections. Far right and conservative formations have recently been trying to reinterpret the republican front so as to exclude candidates from the far left La France insoumise (LFI) rather than from the far right.

The fact that the presidential and parliamentary elections are staggered may also lead to voters being willing to take the opportunity to oppose the newly elected president: non-far-right voters opposing a far-right president, left voters having had to vote for a conservative president to oppose the RN wanting a counterweight in parliament or, conversely, conservative voters deciding to vote for a left president to oppose the RN for the same reason. Taking this into account, achieving an absolute majority in the National Assembly is a huge challenge.

5. Power constellations after the elections

Following this last round of elections, one out of four power constellations will have emerged: a president with an aligned absolute majority in the National Assembly, with an aligned coalition in the National Assembly, with an aligned minority in the National Assembly, or with an opposing majority in the National Assembly. While aligned majorities have been the most common power constellation in past years, non-aligned majorities and minority governments have also been in place for several years.

Overview of members of the National Assembly backing governments relative to the absolute majority threshold and resulting power constellations. Colours reflect political affiliations. Hatched colours represent temporary parliamentary group support. Ruling presidents are indicated on the left side. Sources until 1997, and for 2002, 2007, 2012, 2017, 2022 and 2024.

 

5.1 Embracing full presidential power: a president with an aligned absolute majority

A president with an absolute majority in the National Assembly has been the standard case for most of this century, and the one the Fifth Republic was in fact designed to work with. As discussed above, this constellation comes with a massive presidential influence on governmental affairs and a shift of executive power towards the president. When the president decides on a policy, the prime minister then implements this with the help of the National Assembly. This might work in a seamless way, as it did during President Macron’s first term (2017–2022) and allow for a freedom of action that is rare in western democracies. It might also be altered by reluctant members of the National Assembly challenging presidential decisions, as was the case during President Hollande’s mandate (2012–2017), with a significant number of socialist parliamentarians rebelling. The president is especially strong during a first mandate, when the party is dependent on his or her popularity for the years to come to win elections.

Such a constellation offers an exceptional position on the European scene, as decisions taken by the president are likely to be translated into genuine political action quickly and without major amendments. Neither the government nor the members of parliament have a strong interest in challenging the president’s international posture, even though constitutional constraints remain. The Constitutional Council, the Conseil d’État, European and international treaties, the judiciary, and the Senate will act as checks and balances on executive and legislative power. Severe budgetary issues, combining high debt levels and large ongoing deficits, will also impact the government’s room for manoeuvre.

Given a political culture favouring executive action, a president backed by an absolute majority in the National Assembly would be in a strong position to implement a political programme and exert influence at the EU level.

5.2 Inconvenient ruling: a president with an aligned coalition majority

Political agreements with minor parties have been commonplace during the Fifth Republic, but there is no tradition of formal coalition agreements between sizeable parties. Coalitions tend to be seen as counter to the spirit of the Fifth Republic and the prevailing winner-takes-all political culture. President Macron preferred to work with a minority government after falling short of an absolute majority in 2022, rather than seeking lasting agreements with other parties, which were not keen on seeking compromise. An incoming president might see things differently and try to forge lasting agreements with other political parties by making concessions.

A key determinant for the stability of such an agreement would be the ideological distance between associated parties. While there are no examples of past formal coalitions, looser arrangements have been concluded from time to time and offer some insights. The gauche plurielle (binding socialists to communist, left and green parties from 1997 to 2002) lasted for a full legislative period and was relatively stable. Other kinds of association, like the participation of Greens in the first governments under President Hollande, were uneasy and fell apart quickly. Disagreements and infighting have been notorious for the non-governing alliances formed mostly by the PS, Greens and LFI since 2022. Conservative and centre-right parties have a long tradition of mutual parliamentary support that still endures in the Senate. President Macron’s parliamentary base was never unitary either, with several parties being part of it over time: Renaissance and the Mouvement Démocrate (MoDem), Parti Radical, Horizons and for a short time the main conservative party Les Républicains (LR).

As severe budgetary challenges and ensuing unpopular decisions are close to unavoidable, any agreement arrived at would be subject to strain, adding to the already difficult task of finding common ground. The probability of experiencing instability could be especially high in cases when conservative and progressive forces would need to find common ground, but could possibly work with an association between ideologically close parties, like the Rassemblement National and the Union des droites pour la République (UDR, a 2024 far-right split from the conservative party LR), Horizons together with MoDem and LR, or the socialist PS, the moderate left Place Publique, and Les Écologistes (Greens).

This would automatically affect the extent of presidential influence on all levels, including the European. Being obliged to take heed of another party’s interests and sensitivities would slow down decision-making, hurt the image of an all-powerful president and shift the centre of power from the Elysée palace closer to the prime minister’s office, parliamentary groups and party leaderships. The greater the ideological distance, the lower the probability of sweeping and potentially disruptive presidential action occurring. Ultimately, the president would be able to take political action in the EU, albeit not to the extent seen as usual in France and more akin to parliamentary democracies in other European countries. The lack of experience with coalitions could also lead to an unexpected implosion of alliances over seemingly minor matters.

5.3 Fragile equilibrium: a president with an aligned minority government

France has limited experience of minority government. For a prime minister to stay in office without being subjected to no-confidence votes, the government has to rely on a strong minority of members of the National Assembly and be more attractive to non-aligned parliamentarians than other parties in a position to form a minority government. In short: being weak, but still being stronger than others. This was the case from 1988 to 1993, when the socialists fell just short of an absolute majority, and from 2022 to 2024, when the parties supporting President Macron met the same fate. The parties supporting the president were in both cases stronger than other single parliamentary groups and could make use of constitutional prerogatives like Article 49.3 (passing a government proposal without a vote in parliament, while exposing itself to a vote of no-confidence in return) to force votes in their favour or enabling them to govern on a bumpy case-by-case basis.

Even more precarious is the situation arising after the 2024 legislative elections, following President Macron’s decision to dissolve the National Assembly. This has resulted in a historically weak minority government in terms of parliamentary backing, a rapid turnover of prime ministers, the inability to take significant legislative action, and unprecedented difficulties in agreeing on a budget. The minority governments from 2024 were only able to be formed because the three large political camps in the National Assembly (centre to centre right, left to far left, and far right) were unwilling and unable to cooperate, only at times joining forces to topple the government or allow for the adoption of a less ambitious budget after long and painful negotiations.

In such a fragile and particularly demanding constellation, a president would be unlikely to initiate major reforms, restructure the budget and pursue long-term goals. The very limited presidential influence would be mostly restricted to the international scene and, even then, only when there were no budgetary strings attached to her or his decisions. This means severe restrictions for European action going beyond the status quo. Only in the most important defence affairs would the president still have the power to take decisions about defence into his or her own hands. In other areas, ministers could act in the European Council, but every attempt to push through decisions that were controversial domestically could trigger resistance and endanger the government’s very survival, as it would be dependent on the goodwill of non-aligned members of the National Assembly to fend off a vote of no-confidence.

The danger of being unable to take comprehensive action for a whole term will increase the temptation for a president to dissolve the National Assembly as soon as the odds appear more favourable, for instance because voters have grown tired of witnessing political impasse. Popular resentment over political inaction may, however, equally benefit opposition parties and increase the prospect of a cohabitation agreement, lessening the president’s influence on domestic matters. 

5.4 Disturbing others governing: a president with an opposing absolute majority

This fourth constellation is characterized by cohabitation, where a party opposing the president has an absolute majority in the National Assembly. In this case, presidential power is limited to what the constitution guarantees, which is not much in terms of active influence. Governmental affairs are led by the prime minister backed by the National Assembly. While it is an extremely uncomfortable set-up for the president, it is not one that politically neutralizes him or her. Presidential prerogatives originally intended as a check on government can be used to slow down legal procedures or even block processes such as nominations, making life difficult for the government. Cohabitation also offers the president a platform to criticize a government’s actions while still enjoying the limelight and occupying the presidential office for years to come.

Cohabitation is difficult to navigate politically, as the constitution does not prescribe any clear rules. Issues like the degree of influence wielded by the president in choosing ministers or proposing EU Commissioners are matters for negotiation and thus sources of conflict. The willingness of presidents to subjugate themselves to the constitution and to find compromises has made past cohabitations possible. The goal was to avoid political inertia and not to tarnish French influence on the global and European stage. Whether this logic would also be assumed by the far right or far left if either were to hold the presidency or a majority in the National Assembly is at best questionable.

Previous periods of cohabitation have led to presidential comebacks after some years (for example Mitterrand in 1988 or Chirac in 2002). This was when presidential terms still lasted seven years and always outlasted the legislative terms of five years. A president would still have the possibility to shorten the National Assembly’s legislative term by dissolving it, at the risk of losing even more power, as happened with President Macron in 2024. 

In a moderate scenario where president and government try to work together constructively and responsibly, the government would mostly be the decision-maker in European affairs, with a stronger role for the president in defence-related matters and in negotiating international treaties. A working relationship between the president and government would mean the government having the political leeway to act on the European stage, with the caveat of its range of action being limited to the scope of most other parliamentary democracies.

In a worst-case scenario, constant infighting could paralyze political action at the top level and fuel citizens’ frustration with the political system’s ability to moderate these conflicts. It could also tempt incumbents to overcome a political deadlock by calling for a referendum or even to challenge legal and constitutional limits. A dysfunctional cohabitation would amount to a France largely absent from the European stage, with further risks of derailing and disruptive political conflicts further down the road.

6. A referendum revolution?

Irrespective of the power constellations, one announcement by Marine Le Pen carries additional repercussions for Europe, should she win the presidential elections. She has announced she would change the constitution through a referendum, to be held on the same day as the first round of legislative elections (probably in early June). The proposal that would be voted on has already been published, in 2024, when the RN tried to pass it in parliament; minor changes have been announced since. The proposal includes sweeping changes to the constitution, altering more than a fifth of all articles. It is framed primarily as a referendum on immigration and the RN’s notion of “national priority”, which would allow for the currently unconstitutional discrimination of people without French citizenship in hiring, housing and access to social benefits, as well as massively constraining the chances to acquire citizenship. 

In fact, the proposal goes far beyond these points. The constitution stipulates the primacy of European law and of international treaties, which the RN sees as an additional obstacle to its plans for France. The referendum would amend this to establish the primacy of French law in all cases. This would constitute an unprecedented threat to France’s European and human rights commitments. 

While the proposal’s ground-breaking content would have stark implications for France’s European partners if adopted, the intended referendum process is also deeply problematic. The RN wants to bypass the high bar needed for amendments to the constitution by calling for a referendum under Article 11 of the constitution. Under this, the president is empowered to call a referendum under Article 11 in the case of a proposal by the government relating to a specific group of topics (economic, social or environmental policy, the organizational set-up of public authorities, or ratifying a treaty), indirectly excluding constitutional revisions. A preliminary government nominated by a President Le Pen – but, crucially, before elections to the National Assembly – would have to hand in a proposal quickly before facing a vote of no-confidence in parliament. She would not need a majority in the National Assembly to initiate it. The requirements in this case are lower than for a referendum to alter the constitution.

Referenda pertaining to the constitution would require, under Article 89, previous approval by both the National Assembly and the Senate. The Rassemblement National and allies hold only about 5% of seats in the Senate, with the last senatorial elections having taken place in September 2026. This would make the use of Article 89 impossible without convincing nearly all conservative and centre-right senators to back the RN’s proposal, which is an unrealistic prospect. But the constitution can also be changed without a referendum. Article 89 states that it can also be passed by parliament when both chambers convene in congress (members of the National Assembly and assembled senators), with a three-fifths majority of all parliamentarians needed to adopt changes, a threshold the RN is also unlikely to surmount.

As the RN expects not to be able to fulfil the requirements for calling a referendum under Article 89, it intends to do so under Article 11. This would be a clear breach of the constitution. While there have been precedents for using Article 11 for constitutional change (when President de Gaulle did so in 1962 and 1969), this was done at a time when the Constitutional Council was more constrained and unable to formally stop the referendum. This is no longer the case; an intervention by the Constitutional Council is all but guaranteed this time around. It is unclear how the RN will react in such a case, with Le Pen sending mixed messages about possible responses. From ignoring the Constitutional Council (thereby provoking a major rule-of-law crisis), to bypassing it later with the help of both parliamentary chambers, to trying to submit an entirely new constitution to the French people, a range of options is still on the table.

The repercussions of a referendum would be far-reaching. If approved in its current form, it would directly challenge the foundation of the EU’s legal order. Were it to be passed through a referendum under Article 11 of the French constitution, this would add a national dimension to the broader European rule-of-law crisis.

7. Conclusion

Which version of French leadership will Europe see by summer 2027? High unpredictability is inherent in the electoral system, where just one or two percentage points in the vote can have decisive effects and would likely lead to shifts in subsequent voting behaviour across four election rounds. What is clear, however, is that it will be difficult by French standards to win all elections with different underlying political logics, bridge a fragmented political landscape and not trigger major resistance at some point, which will all be required if the country is to have a president with an aligned absolute majority in the National Assembly.

Several shades of influence at the EU level are possible, depending on the resulting power constellations. One question concerns what kind of European influence will France have, and a related one is to what end that influence will be used for: a much-needed constructive way of approaching European integration, as France did throughout the lifetime of the Fifth Republic, and one of the reasons the EU has been able to thrive? 

Or will a more destructive path be chosen? The Rassemblement National has already openly stated that it would call a referendum to challenge one of the pillars of European integration, the primacy of EU law, even before the new National Assembly was in place and a lasting government could take up office. Both questions are tied together, as winning only parts of the elections will not be enough to implement extensive change regardless of any particular government’s aims. Which pathway France will ultimately take will play a major role in determining the European Union’s future. 

 

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