In March 2024, the Franco-German Parliamentary Assembly (FGPA) celebrated its fifth anniversary. This binational forum can be viewed as a genuine step towards integration in Franco-German relations besides the Aachen Treaty. The FGPA is designed to be a watchdog over the Franco-German treaties and to bring together political actors of both countries to discuss and resolve conflictual issues and contribute to European initiatives. After five years of its being, the results are mixed. Franco-German governmental relations are more conflictual than ever. While the FGPA proved added value during the Covid-19 pandemic by convincing the French and German interior ministers to lift border controls, it has been notably reticent on the Ukraine war and other foreign policy conflicts. The FGPA would benefit by being bolder and extricating itself step-by-step from national political constraints. In this way, parliamentary dialogue can help the two key partners to find common ground on a range of European issues.
Introduction
In March this year, the Franco-German Parliamentary Assembly (FGPA) turned five. This bilateral assembly was constituted in 2019 shortly after the signing of a new intergovernmental treaty, the Aachen Treaty, between France and Germany. As a parliamentary body, the FGPA brings together 100 members of parliament from both countries, 50 from the German Bundestag and 50 from the Assemblée nationale. The representatives of the two national parliaments meet at least twice a year to exchange views and debate Franco-German and European issues. In the parliamentary agreement that forms the basis for the FGPA, they purport to act as the watchdog over Franco-German treaties and, to that end, pursue the goal of bringing together German and French positions at European level in order to strengthen EU integration. This year the bilateral assembly has not yet met due to snap parliamentary elections in France that are causing political turmoil and instability on the other side of the Rhine. This is because the election results have failed to produce a clear and workable ruling majority in the Assemblée and have strengthened the anti-democratic and eurosceptic far right. All of this uncertainty has spilled over onto the work of the FGPA.
Back in 2019, both the FGPA and the Aachen Treaty gave great momentum to Franco-German relations and provided the basis for what should have been an ever closer relationship. While the Aachen Treaty for the first time formally recognizes the diversity of Franco-German actors and fosters cross-border cooperation at sub-national level, the FGPA adds a parliamentary dimension to the relationship. New institutions such as the Franco-German citizen fund that supports small scale civil society projects or the committee for cross-border cooperation were swiftly set up. But while Franco-German relations in these areas blossomed, governmental relations have at the same time worsened in recent years. The reasons for this are varied and range from domestic political constraints and a demanding international context to misunderstandings and miscommunication at the highest political level. For example, in autumn 2022, the negotiations on a European gas price cap betrayed a lack of Franco-German coordination and communication and led to accusations in public about national solo efforts. Similarly, a long planned Franco-German Council of Ministers meeting in October 2022 was postponed supposedly because of scheduling difficulties on the part of some ministers.
This development is worrying as Franco-German cooperation matters greatly for decision-making in the European Union (EU). These countries are the two largest EU member states. They account for 34 percent of the population (2022), a scale which heavily impacts upon EU decisions, as the number of inhabitants determines each member state’s voting power in the EU’s qualified majority voting system. Equally, they are responsible for 41 percent of EU GDP (2023) or a substantial part of its economic output and clout. In the past, the Franco-German tandem took on key leadership tasks such as building consensus, forging coalitions, and setting the policy agenda, thus driving European integration forward. If France and Germany fail to agree, the EU can be blocked several times over. For example, the reform of the EU electricity market was stalled for months in 2023 due to major disagreements between the two over the role of nuclear energy. This happened amid soaring energy prices because of the Russo-Ukrainian war. It was precisely to ease or even overcome such bilateral conflicts that the FGPA was established. This policy brief argues that the FGPA managed to improve Franco-German cooperation in some areas but that its influence on governmental relations remains limited.
A Driver for Franco-German Rapprochement
The Franco-German Parliamentary Assembly is a driver for bilateral rapprochement. The biannual meetings of a sizeable number of parliamentarians and their hearings of ministers create more understanding of the positions held by the partner country and foster communication and cooperation. Since its creation in 2019, the FGPA has met 13 times, normally twice a year in France or Germany. The FGPA takes decisions with a simple majority which are not legally binding, but simply recommendations (see rules of procedure). These decisions are supposed to be taken up by the national parliaments and some of them were indeed discussed further in national parliamentary committees such as the proposal to set up a night train between Paris and Berlin. The FGPA also prepared two common resolutions, one on the implementation of the Aachen treaty in 2019 and a second on the promotion of French and German language learning in 2023. Both were voted on directly in the Bundestag and the Assemblée nationale.
Parliamentary Exchange Improves Mutual Understanding
The regular meetings of the FGPA and its working groups fostered exchanges among politicians and improved mutual understanding. The MPs garnered knowledge about the others’ political system and culture as well as the current political discourse in the partner country. Furthermore, they learnt about decision-making structures and political positions of the government but also about those of opposition parties. Most importantly, they could develop an understanding of the differences and similarities in political positions. In this way, they were able to contribute to finding solutions for conflictual issues at bilateral and European level. According to parliamentary sources, the recent working group on energy sovereignty was very productive in this regard, for instance. Moreover, former members of the FGPA have joined the German government during the last five years and brought with them this Franco-German socialisation or savoir-faire. This is a process that is not always visible but has an impact on the development of a common position and of joint initiatives on bilateral and European questions.
Governmental Hearings are a Key Instrument
A crucial instrument in the hands of the bilateral assembly is governmental hearings. French and German ministers with different portfolios have been invited to each plenary session in the last five years. During these hearings, the ministers had to deal with the Franco-German dimension of their policy field. They were thus led to consider the position of their counterpart while defending their own position in front of parliamentarians from both countries. Consequently, this promoted greater sensitivity towards the political positions of the partner country and fostered dialogue and common initiatives at governmental level. For example, a May 2020 hearing took place with the French and German interior ministers right in the middle of the Covid-19 pandemic. During this session, the parliamentarians successfully channelled popular discontent in cross-border regions caused by closures due to measures to protect public health. In the end, the ministers agreed to partially lift border controls.
Figure 1: Composition of Franco-German Parliamentary Assembly until June 2024.
Steering and Filter Function of the Bureau and Working Groups
Both the FGPA’s bureau and working groups hold a steering and filter function and significantly drive the work of the bilateral assembly forward. The bilateral bureau, which comprises the two co-presidents and members of each political group represented in the French and German parliaments, effectively steers the work of the FGPA. It functions as a filter for initiatives from the FGPA members. A large part of the content-related work is also carried out in the temporary working groups. Since its constitution in 2019, the FGPA has established nine working groups on different policy topics such as foreign and security policy, energy or the future of Europe. Four have issued a report that was adopted in the plenary session and comprises recommendations for government and parliament on the relevant issue under discussion. Two working groups (on foreign, defence, and security policy and on migration, asylum, and integration) simply summarised their activity without drawing any concrete conclusions and three are planning to deliver their report in the upcoming FGPA sessions this year. The working groups are not permanent but have a fixed time frame. For example, from 2022 to 2023, a working group tackled the question on how to harmonise the transposition of EU directives into French and German law. So far, EU directives set objectives that need to be individually met by member states. The concrete national measures and time schedule for transposition into national law often diverge. Common approaches found here are pioneering work-in-progress that can foster EU integration. In its conclusions, this working group recommends a coherent and systematic approach to the adoption of EU directives and coordination among concerned national committees and national ministries.
Extraordinary Sessions for Urgent Issues
The management of the Covid-19 pandemic in France and Germany is a good example of how effective the FGPA can be if it takes up current issues. During the public health emergency in 2020 and 2021 the FGPA met not only twice a year but conducted several extraordinary sessions to keep pace with the political and economic developments related to the pandemic. As described above, the FGPA successfully channelled discontent in the border region and brought about a ministerial agreement. Similarly, the parliamentarians advocated early on for a European solution to deal with the economic and social consequences of the pandemic. They gave full backing to the Franco-German rapprochement that led to the bilateral initiative for a European recovery fund in May 2020 by issuing declarations and formally hearing the ministers of economy during the EU decision-making process. The more precisely the FGPA acts, the more impact it can have. For example, the proposal of the FGPA to re-establish a night train from Paris to Berlin was supported by the national railway operators in both countries and realised in 2023.
Limits to the FGPA’s Influence on Governmental Relations
Despite the progress that the FGPA has brought to Franco-German relations, governmental relations have deteriorated over the last two years. It seems even more difficult to find common ground in a range of policy fields such as defence or nuclear energy. For example, joint arms procurement projects such as the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) have often teetered on the brink of failure due to conflicts over leadership between the French and German defence companies involved, and the reluctance of politicians to bridge the gap. In the case of nuclear energy, the core divide is the question whether it should figure as a key element of the transition to a low-carbon society and economy in the EU. While nuclear energy is a strong pillar in the French economy and guarantees energy security, Germany has phased it out due to a strong anti-nuclear stance taken by the public and politicians. It is instead focussing on renewable energies. The FGPA could not alleviate these tensions. Its influence on Franco-German governmental relations is, indeed, limited for several reasons.
Institutional Limitations
One reason is related to the institutional design of the Franco-German Parliamentary Assembly. As the FGPA cannot take binding decisions, it is a weak institution, compared to national parliaments. It can make recommendations that may (or may not) be considered by the two national parliaments and governments, but it cannot enforce them. Furthermore, its members are delegated by their parliaments and not directly elected. The population is not represented in proportion to its size as both countries send 50 MPs. There is also the distinct possibility that only MPs from the border region truly engage in the FGPA. All this tends to undermine the representative nature of the FGPA in the eyes of governments. Moreover, the FGPA only meets twice a year which makes it difficult for the assembly to react to current political developments. In similar vein, the long reconstitution period hampered bi-parliamentary work in 2021 and 2022. This was a consequence of national elections in Germany in autumn 2021 and then in France in summer 2022. During the election campaigns and the formation of government as well as adopting the new constitution of the FGPA itself, bi-parliamentary work slowed down. This made it difficult, for example, for the FGPA to take a strong position towards the outbreak of war in Ukraine in February 2022. With the snap parliamentary elections in France in June and July this year, called by President Macron in response to the European Parliament election results bi-parliamentary work was put on hold again. The first session of the FGPA due on 24 June had to be hurriedly cancelled and the presentation of working group reports was postponed to a later date. There is uncertainty whether the reports and the deliberations conducted so far should be reopened given the significantly changed composition of the French delegation. So far, the French delegation has not yet taken shape . The hope is that it will be established by autumn so that the next session of the FGPA can still take place this coming winter.
Dependence on Home Parliaments
The composition of the FGPA reflects that of the home parliaments in terms of the size and strength of parliamentary groups. If national elections occur, the respective delegation changes, too. For example, the recent snap election in France weakened the pro-European and pro-German party of President Macron and strengthened the left-wing alliance, the Nouveau Front Populaire (NFP) and the extreme right Rassemblement national (RN). Although the new French delegation is yet to take shape, it is already clear that the FGPA will see many more MPs of the French extreme right within its ranks. In the past the extreme right as well as the radical left party La France Insoumise (LFI) have grabbed attention with their eurosceptic and anti-German attitudes. Although they do not have a majority in the French delegation and are at odds with one another, they can still make cooperation inside the FGPA harder to achieve. For example, the assembly quorum for decision-making is set at more than 25 MPs of each delegation (50%). Together the RN and LFI will have most likely around 21 MPs. Even if this is below the threshold, the other parties will have to make more of an effort to be fully present in case of RN’s and LFI’s absenteeism.
Furthermore, the FGPA relies on its home parliaments to influence governments and depends in turn on how seriously these parliaments take the assembly, given that it cannot take binding decisions. But the two national parliaments differ significantly in their relationship with the executive. Especially, in France the Assemblée nationale is hedged in by the constitution and confined to specific policy fields. The French constitution limits the self-organisation and autonomy of the parliament. To give an example, the number of committees is constitutionally restricted to eight and cannot be changed except through a constitutional amendment. The constitution also grants important prerogatives to the executive. For example, the directly elected president can dissolve the parliament. Moreover, the president alone decides on external relations policy , thus also bilateral relations, as the parliament has no competence in this field. In contrast, the Bundestag has far-reaching powers, strong autonomy, and a say on foreign policy issues. German parliamentarians, for example, need to approve military missions. The different functions and role of the Bundestag and the Assemblée nationale within their respective national systems are a challenge to parliamentary cooperation inside the FGPA. Decisions taken by the assembly must comply with both systems.
Political Limitations
France and Germany often disagree on a broad range of policy questions. This is due to significant differences in their political system, culture, and history. Some topics such as energy policy or foreign, defence and security policy are particularly difficult. These political differences have a restrictive effect on the parliamentary work, too.
Regarding foreign, defence and security policy, the bilateral assembly encountered, for example, the same major divergences as the governments did. A first working group on this issue was unable to agree on a common report that could be adopted in the plenary in June 2021. The goal was inter alia to promote dialogue on developing a common strategic culture. Both countries diverge remarkably in their conception of foreign policy, strategic culture, andwillingness to use military means. France sees itself as a military power that is globally active, while Germany considers itself, first and foremost, as a civil economic power. Since the Zeitenwende speech of Chancellor Olaf Scholz in 2022 and the Russo-Ukrainian War, this is only slowly changing. The FGPA working group orally reported to the plenary in June 2021 that political differences were too large to draft a common report. A subsequent working group was only reluctantly set up in May 2023 despite the immediate critical international context.
Much Potential Despite the Limits
The intense parliamentary exchanges inside the FGPA nevertheless harbour potential for the convergence of political positions between France and Germany. In this regard, its functioning can be improved in the following ways:
- Governmental hearings are a success and should be continued. The FGPA needs to further insist on the presence of both French and German ministers during any hearing. Virtual participation and absence should be the exception – even if French ministers sometimes wonder about the parliamentary “summons”.
- The FGPA would benefit if it dared to be bolder and extricate itself carefully from national political constraints. National politics should not prevent exchanges in the FGPA on a sensitive bi-national topic. On the contrary, the FGPA can be the stage for discussing these conflictual issues, such as foreign policy questions, and finding a compromise at best. The FGPA becomes insignificant if it only deals with consensual matters.
- The bilateral assembly can carefully make use of extraordinary sessions under certain circumstances, as it did in its initial phase during the Covid-19 pandemic. It would allow the FGPA to react rapidly to crises such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine and influence government policy-making.
- As the FGPA cannot take legally binding decisions, its parliamentary influence is, however, limited. It should therefore strengthen its anchoring within the national parliaments and make sure that bilateral decisions are taken up and dealt with in national committees and by parliamentary groups. For example, the FGPA bureau can insist that FGPA decisions are sent to national committees and follow up on them. Each FGPA bureau member can ensure that the assembly’s decisions and activities are reported in the leaders’ meetings of their parliamentary group. Furthermore, the presidents of the national parliaments which are also presidents of the FGPA have a key role as intermediary. They can create the link between the FGPA and the conference of presidents in the Assemblée nationale or the Council of Elders in the Bundestag. Both are influential bodies that organize the work of the two national parliaments. This increases the reach of FGPA decisions. In the same sense, the FGPA may propose more regular joint resolutions to their home parliaments which can be then discussed in the national plenary sessions.
- In the medium-term, it would be an innovative and integrationist step for the FGPA to deal with a common legislative proposal. The proposals of the working group on the coherent transposition of EU directives in French and German law are a good starting point for this. It suggested employing the EU directive on Common rules promoting the repair of goods as an initial test case.
Conclusion
More than five years into its existence, the Franco-German Parliamentary Assembly continues to act as a watchdog over the Franco-German Treaties and has effectively deepened bilateral relations between the two countries. At the same time, its influence on the two governments remains limited and it has failed to prevent a worsening of their relations in recent years. If it wants to more effectively contribute to the convergence of political positions between the two countries, it must better secure its anchoring in the national parliaments. This has, however, at least on the French side, become increasingly difficult after the recent snap elections because a politically unstable Assemblée nationale still lacks a clear governing majority. It matters greatly that this should not hinder effective work inside the FGPA and that initiatives from the recent working groups are quickly resumed and adopted and new initiatives such as a common legislative proposal are duly launched.