A farewell letter from Berlin

This is the (much) longer version of my remarks at a farewell reception on 24 September 2025. After three years as Co-Director of the Jacques Delors Centre at the Hertie School in Berlin, I am returning in October to the European Central Bank as Head of the EU Institutions and Fora Division.

I came to Berlin three years ago shortly after then-Chancellor Olaf Scholz's now landmark Zeitenwende speech in which  he  proclaimed: “Europe is our framework for action. Only if we understand this will we be able to meet the challenges of our time.” I was thrilled and eager to play my part in seizing the moment for Europe at a place that seemed to matter most.

At the European Central Bank, I had experienced the years of the euro crisis and long strenuous debates about completing Economic and Monetary Union, but also the impressive Franco-German crisis management at the start of the Covid pandemic that led to NextGenerationEU, the post-pandemic recovery programme. So, I felt strongly: if Berlin is on board, Europe can go far.

Today, I leave with mixed feelings.  

The case for further European integration is stronger than ever, and Berlin’s role even more central. The continuing war in Ukraine, the rising strength of China, and Trump’s return to power intensify the external threats to security, growth and democracy in Europe. They crystallise the dialectic opposite of what Europe is not in terms of values and policies. And they increase the need to regain autonomy by reducing external dependencies and building up capacities, particularly in the realm of economic and military security – areas that touch upon core functions of the nation state. No member state, including Germany, can stand alone in this. And given the domestic political situation in many of its partners, there are high expectations for Germany to provide leadership in shaping a common European strategy.

I am still quite hopeful that the new German government is willing to take up that challenge. In keynote speeches at the Jacques Delors Centre, Chancellor Friedrich Merz (at the time still opposition leader) and Federal Minister of Finance and Vice-Chancellor Lars Klingbeil have both underlined their aspirations to strengthen Europe.

I am proud about what we have achieved with the Jacques Delors Centre. Its unique set-up at the Hertie School as both research centre and think tank, its close links to its two “sisters” in Paris and Brussels, and – above all – a fantastic team have made the JDC an important provider of ideas and advice on European integration in Berlin. I have tried to lead in the tradition of Henrik Enderlein, its founder, and I am delighted to be handing over now to a younger generation of outstanding think tankers, Thu Nguyen and Nils Redeker, who, as deputy directors, have already been key pillars of the team.

At the same time, I have been disappointed about the slow progress on European integration over the last three years. That much-lauded Zeitenwende did not translate into a strong German leadership on EU policies. Moreover, the reports by Mario Draghi (on competitiveness) and Enrico Letta (on the Single Market), alongside multiple proposals for a stronger European defence capability may have provided clear analyses and concrete proposals for what can and should be done. But strong political ambition to forcefully debate and follow up on them is, in my eyes, is missing.

Over these three years, I have thus increasingly asked myself whether those of us who support deeper integration are really pursuing the right approach: isn’t this constant waiting for the next set of enlightened national politicians and the next big crisis to propel a genuine forward leap somewhat insufficient?

My view is that there are structural challenges holding us back:

• While foreign policy is prominent in the news, the space for more detailed discussion of EU topics and long-term strategies is very small on a crowded and constantly evolving domestic policy agenda.
• While the EU has reacted to the war in Ukraine, the ensuing surge in energy prices, the challenges of the more radical second Trump presidency and heightened geoeconomic tensions with important policy measures, this high frequency of crises has worn out many national politicians and increased their reluctance to take political risks at the EU level.
• While the case for strong European policy responses is increasingly acknowledged, citizens and national politicians feel quite far away from EU decision-making in Brussels and have doubts about the EU’s ability to deliver.

This is further fuelled by the rise of populism – both at the EU level with populist politicians wielding power in the EP and the Council, and more importantly at the national level where mainstream parties are increasingly uncertain, nay floundering, about how to counter this dynamic.

I see a vicious circle that scares me. It stems from a sense that defeat is inevitable. So often I hear that we cannot take big steps towards a more integrated Europe because of the populist threats. But in failing to deliver or innovate, we are providing the populists with the ammunition to rise further. It is we who create the dynamic of inevitability.

But I would hope we can stop this. I dream of a virtuous circle consisting of four mutually reinforcing elements:

• More vision: We need to combine the concrete plans for further integration with a clear compass on where we are headed. For me, this is a federation with a strong centre and nation states that will need to relinquish more of their core functions, especially as the EU enters the realm of common security.
• More politics: We need to a new political space that combines more strongly the national and the European levels and allows for more and, with that, genuine political debate on EU topics and decisions.
• More emotions: The EU has for too long been handled as a technocratic project. The common values and joint interests of Europe are under threat, so I would wish to see us reinforcing the EU´s ideational foundation and providing more affective links.
• More mobilisation: We need to put the responsibility for pursuing this bolder vision and for reinforcing political debates and affective links onto more shoulders than politicians (ranging from academia, think tanks to civil society and the business world) and activate citizens through it - even beyond the EU topics.

In developing these four elements, I turn to Jacques Delors. Even before I became co-director of the Jacques Delors Centre, I held this visionary European politician, in high regard. My strong admiration grew further during these last three years in which I have learned so much more about him, had the chance to briefly meet him just months before he passed away in 2023, and worked with some of his closest collaborators. Even if Delors’ political successes date back more than three decades, I feel that his writing and thinking foreshadows our needs of today. Moreover, what I sketch out here echoes the rationale behind the new Jacques Delors Friends of Europe Foundation which seeks to support both think tank work and mobilise for more EU-wide debates and action.

1. A bolder vision

Jacques Delors felt a strong sense of urgency in his mission to advance Europe: For him it was about “Europe or decline”. The nation states would individually be unable to tackle the competition from other global economies. Only together could Europe’s nations avoid decline and overcome (euro)sclerosis. And only together could they avert the retreat into nationalism and chauvinism that had destroyed Europe twice in the 20th century. He had an overall framework for what the EU should be: a “Federation of Nation States”. This combined a federalist method of strengthening the centre with the recognition that – in the spirit of subsidiarity – individual nations would continue to play an important (albeit more reduced) role. Yet, Delors was also very concrete and practical in what member states needed to do jointly and in what timeframe this should be achieved. This led to the Single Market programme with the 1992 deadline and the three steps towards the euro.

As mentioned above, I do not see that the EU today lacks concrete proposals that can be translated into precise action plans. And I feel that many reports, particularly the one by Mario Draghi, do convey a strong sense of urgency – warning against the “slow agony” of economic decline or pointing at the very real security threats resulting from a US withdrawal of its security support for Ukraine and the EU. What is missing in my view is a broader sense of direction. We turn a blind eye to precisely where the EU is headed politically and institutionally.

Here, I find that the notion of “Federation of Nation States” provides a helpful compass and deserves greater accentuation. It is bold in that it frames the EU as a federation that needs a strong centre but leaves the precise balance between federal level and nation state up for evolution. The EU is already taking over core governance functions from the nation states. It has features of a state-like polity. We need to be more explicit about this and make clear that today we live in a period in which the existing competencies at the European level must be used much better and further powers should be devolved upwards to the centre.

After the failure of the draft Constitutional Treaty, we have shied away from referring to the state-building process and from speaking confidently about our “ever closer union”. I think this was a mistake. Seeing the EU as a federation allows us to be bolder in transforming proposals into action plans and more explicit in shaping the state-like features that the EU has. This is especially relevant the more the EU turns towards common security and moves (even more) beyond market regulation and economic integration. I see a contradiction between the calls for much stronger cooperation on security and defence in Europe and the unwillingness to discuss how such cooperation will (need to) transform the nature of both, the EU and the nation states.

2. More politics

Delors understood that building the EU as a federation needs to start by treating supranational decisions as deeply political matters. He knew the European project cannot advance only on technical fixes or intergovernmental deals behind closed doors. While he was very much a man of compromise and dialogue, adept at bridging differences and combining interests, he accepted that this needed to be the result of open and intense discussions.

With more competencies ascribed to the European level, we have already seen more politicisation and more politics in EU decision-making. This has brought about more coverage by the media and more awareness among citizens. We are heading in the right direction, but we need to go further.

Of course, politicisation is not without risk, especially in a supranational setting. We want to avoid the possibility that debate and decision-making are obstructed or derailed by structural divisions and repeated stand-offs among member states, or by deep-rooted opposition to the EU. But there is no alternative to political debate as it generates the necessary legitimacy and ownership. Yet, it should take place on the basis of a consensus within the democratic political spectrum on common standards of how the debate shall work – thereby preventing a copying of the populists. And we see the risks of polarisation also at the national level but this does not lead to calls for less political debates nationally.

The central role of national politics

A key challenge for the EU is to create a new political space that combines the national and EU levels of policy-making more strongly and makes EU topics more prominent in the national political debates.

Delors recognised that debates on EU topics would need to enter national politics. He said (probably a bit too boldly): “There is not too little democracy in Europe, but too little Europe in national democracies”.

National politicians play a key role here. They are not only leaders of their country but also shapers of Europe’s destiny. Yet often they see themselves as national crisis managers only and defend narrowly defined national interests. They often prefer the known status-quo to uncertain European solutions. That is particularly true when the EU begins to take on core state functions, such as security and defence. Moreover, national topics, such as taxes, pensions, housing and infrastructure, tend to dominate the political agenda, leaving little space for EU issues. My experience is that so often the EU is seen as a niche topic despite the wider implications that decisions in Brussels have for national politics.

Changing this will not be easy. But I see two potential forces for change.

First, businesses and citizens share a responsibility to push European issues onto national agendas - and they have good reasons to do so. Industry, in particular, has much to lose from a weaker EU and should be keen to make its voice heard. In the run-up to the 2019 European Parliament elections, when Brexit and President Trump’s first term unsettled many, movements such as Pulse of Europe and industry-led initiatives to boost turnout were encouraging. We are now at a juncture at least as consequential as 2019. Bringing EU topics into national politics can - and at times should – also be partisan. For example, several national industry associations are currently criticising sustainability reporting requirements stemming from EU legislation. While there are strong counterarguments against sweeping rollbacks, I view these initiatives positively: they underscore that debating compliance costs and administrative burdens in Germany without reference to the relevant EU rules is piecemeal engineering.

This leads me to my second point: We need stronger competition among positions along the political spectrum. This is linked to the idea of a stronger role for the families of European parties. It is not a new idea but still very relevant: When national politicians see European policies as the extension of competing political visions at the national level, they will be looking much more strongly for allies at the EU level and reinforce the link between the national and the European level. This is ultimately what we need and should aim for.

Politicisation needs to go hand in hand with reforms at the EU level

Delors actively supported dialogue with and more representation of civil society, business, unions and regions at the European level. Moreover, his vision of central decision-making was one of checks and balances, with a strong role for the directly elected European Parliament.

Convergence of national debates across the Union and the emergence of a “European demos” will take time. And, similarly, the link between the EP and its MEPs with their voters is deepening only gradually. Nevertheless, the more citizens realise that their voting has an impact on decisions at the EU level which in turn have a direct bearing on their day-to-day life, the more we will see interest in EU decision-making increasing within and across member states.

Moreover, this process of Europeanisation needs to be fostered by further institutional reforms. Just as the role of the EP in the choice of the Commission President has increased, formal and informal reforms can help to give citizens more of a direct say and make the EP elections more European. These reforms should include transnational lists, the above-mentioned boost to European political party families, a right of initiative for the EP, and non-binding EU-wide referenda.  

There is a link between politicisation and citizens’ input and the strength of a European executive: There cannot be a strong European executive without a strong directly elected European counterpart to keep it in check and provide legitimacy.

There is a tendency within the European Commission (that is not yet a full European executive) to overstretch and overpromise. This is understandable in a situation of an EU system that constantly has to react to new challenges while being constrained by the political reality of strong veto players in the Council, a Treaty that many member states are reluctant to open, and an EU budget that many member states do not want to expand. At the same time, a Commission that has not been given the necessary tools and competencies should throw the ball back into member states court forcing them to choose between proper European solutions or fragmented national responses.

Both sources of legitimacy for the Commission – better output and direct citizens input – would be helped by a European Parliament that grows further in its role of scrutinising policies, identifying shortcomings, and giving a direct voice to citizens.

3. More emotions

Delors urged us to “put some flesh on the Community’s bones and, dare I suggest, give it a little more soul.” While he never fully defined that term, it seems he thought of a joint narrative, common values, and a shared identity that would attach Europeans more closely to the EU.

Yet, our narrative needs to be updated, and it needs to be told anew. The founding narrative of European integration, namely peace, wealth and democracy in a continent that was torn apart by wars from within for centuries, has not lost its relevance. But especially in today’s world, we see how much peace, wealth and democracy are under threat from the outside. We realise how fundamentally different our understanding of pursuing peace, prosperity and democracy is from what is currently happening in Russia, China and the US, and that it is anything but a given.

• In contrast to Russia, the EU rejects war as a means of international politics. It believes in the territorial integrity of states and the power of multilateral agreements. At its very core, the EU is built on cooperation, negotiation, compromise, integration and the peaceful evolution of its member states, their relationships and Europe as a whole.
• In contrast to China, the EU rejects the idea of a state-driven economy that, as its final goal, is designed to support an autocratic regime.  The European economy rests on the conviction that free markets, real competition, innovation and the great entrepreneurial spirit of the many, combined with support for those who struggle to find their place within this system, represent the best way forward. 
• In contrast to the US of Donald Trump, the EU rejects the vision of an executive dominating all branches of government, going after its political opponents, ignoring science, rewriting history and coalescing with big (tech) business in pursuit of personal power and money. The EU is – and remains – an open society based on free debate, democratic institutions, the competition of ideas and arguments, fair elections, the peaceful transition of power and the rule of law.

Peace in Europe must be defended, our common values have to be upheld – and in the end, it is up to the Europeans to do so. That is true both externally and internally. When democracy is under threat in one member state (see Poland in the past or Hungary today) then this is a matter of common concern which needs to be addressed by the EU. Otherwise, it loses credibility with its citizens and international partners.

Delivering on the narrative and standing up for common values can help foster an ideational foundation for the Union and create a European identity, an even deeper attachment that EU citizens feel to the polity they live in. Explaining and realising that our shared principles and values cannot be taken for granted, and that they are worth fighting for, could ignite a new sense of direction and commitment in every European.

Similarly, a profound sense of the common history, joint rituals, shared emotions and EU symbols are helpful. So are political participation at the supranational level, professional mobility, personal exchanges and cross-border dialogue. This takes time and often involves even now only the more affluent parts of society. However, we need to be more daring in this regard: common celebrations of Europe Day, a common EU sports team at selected international competitions, Erasmus-like programmes for all parts of society and even a European element within national military/civilian service (e.g. serving one third of your time in another EU country) are just examples of possible measures.

Yet, when pushing identity building measures from the top, we need to be aware that the EU’s motto is ‘unity in diversity’. This implies accepting internal differences as to who we are and what we do. And we need to be careful that we do not replicate at the EU level what we want to prevent at the national level, namely nationalism and chauvinism. There is a dark side to identity that the EU should clearly avoid. But an open and inclusive European identity – complementing existing national and regional ones – is not only important for sustaining the Union. It should help prevent a return of old-style aggressive nationalism that could otherwise emerge as member states boost their military strength and societal resilience.

4. More mobilisation

A bolder vision, more politics and more emotions can (and will) lead to new, positive dynamics in an EU that is and acts more like a state. All these elements taken together can help to unleash hope and confidence. Right now, many citizens feel the future is rather dangerous and bleak. With a broader return to political visions and affective links, a new sense of urgency and optimism could arise, resulting in more mobilisation and (hopefully) a self-reinforcing process. More commitment leads to more actions, more actions lead to more results, and more results lead to more commitment.

Of course, the strengthening of the EU should not be oversold. Our economic and societal challenges are much larger than what a stronger Union alone can solve, and they are not specific to Europe. Examples of (global) challenges include the impact of social media and the rise of AI, the loss of trust in democracy, the political and economic consequence of ageing societies, poverty and widening social inequality, the quality of public services, over-weighty bureaucracies or even corruption. And – last, but not least – the threat of war and the all-encompassing danger of climate change.

But we in Europe have the unique opportunity to use the supranational lever, which can be instrumental in addressing some of these challenges. A rebooted Europe can play a decisive, inspiring and mobilising role in this. Scale matters. Solving problems effectively helps. Legitimacy lends influence. In fact, an ambitious European vision can be helpful in two respects: It shows determination to solve key problems for which populists lack good answers, and it provides hope that can unleash a positive momentum. If successful, Europe could become the global force it aspires to be.

Concluding with courage

Delors’s final words to the European Parliament in January 1995 should still guide us: “Be brave, take heart, the springtime of Europe is still ahead of us!”

Hoping for change or betting on muddling through are no longer sufficient. We need a comprehensive programme and a broad societal movement. Time is of the essence. It is not only inertia that we are up against. The populist right has such a comprehensive programme for their objectives, and they move fast.

The vicious circle that stems from a sense that defeat is inevitable has to be broken. So often I hear that because of the populist threat we cannot take big steps towards a more integrated Europe. But it is true the other way around: in failing to deliver or innovate, we provide the ammunition for the populists to rise further. Therefore, it is up to us to change course and create a new virtuous circle. We have a positive vision. And people want optimism, they want real emotions, and they respect and reward courage.

This does not mean that we all have to sing from the same hymn sheet. As I said, we need to debate intensely and fiercely on what precise policy choices we want to take on security, on climate and on innovation, and which concrete institutional reforms it needs. But I would like this to be done on the basis of a consensus about what is at stake for Europe and all of us.

Some of this may sound more like a naïve dream, and I know well the counterarguments I have left unmentioned. But if not in a letter like this, when else can I dream and dare to challenge the complacency of those who believe everything will be fine and the defeatism of those that warn us against thinking too big?

_{Photo: CC Sebastian Herrmann, Source: Unsplash}