Three questions about Viktor Orbán's defeat

This weekend in Hungary, Péter Magyar’s Tisza (Respect and Freedom) party ousted Fidesz and its long‑time leader, Viktor Orbán, in a landslide victory. During its sixteen years in office, Orbán’s government curtailed media freedom, weakened judicial independence, and hollowed out democratic checks and balances, leading the European Parliament to label Hungary an “electoral autocracy”. At the European level, Orbán frequently obstructed common EU positions, diluted sanctions against Russia, and used his veto to block both military aid to Ukraine and progress on Ukraine’s EU accession path.

Is Orbán’s defeat a cause for celebration, and what does it mean for Hungary and Europe? Dr Thu Nguyen, Acting Co‑Director of the Jacques Delors Centre, discusses the challenges ahead for the new government, what the EU can realistically expect from Budapest, and the lessons Europe should learn about grappling with democratic backsliding in a member state.

Péter Magyar’s Tisza party has just ousted long‑time prime minister Viktor Orbán. What can we expect from the new Hungarian government?

From an EU perspective, the most important change is a new government with a less obstructionist approach towards the EU. For years, Orbán blocked or watered down key EU decisions – especially sanctions against Russia and anything related to Ukraine. With the new government, the main hope is that Hungary will become a more constructive partner.

The other important change will be the restoration of the rule of law in the country. Magyar has promised reforms to restore judicial independence and improve anti‑corruption structures, and the two‑thirds majority he won gives his government the formal ability to undo many Fidesz‑era constitutional changes.

On other issues, though – such as European migration policy – I would expect continuity.

What hurdles do you see in terms of the rule of law in Hungary and in its relations with the EU?

There is definitely room for optimism, but we shouldn’t underestimate how difficult the road ahead will be. Fidesz spent well over a decade filling key posts in the judiciary and public administration with loyalists. The system was reshaped from the inside, and undoing that will take time. Poland is a good example – even after Donald Tusk’s victory in 2023, restoring rule‑of‑law standards has been extremely difficult, and Poland experienced a shorter period of democratic backsliding than Hungary.

Also on EU policy, not all tensions between Hungary and the EU will automatically be resolved by the new government. While Magyar has vowed to rebuild trust with EU institutions and partners, he rejects the EU migration and asylum pact and Ukraine’s accelerated accession to the EU. In the European Parliament, his party’s MEPs voted against the EU’s loan package for Ukraine earlier this year. While some of it might have been election tactics, we shouldn’t assume clear alignment on all issues.

With strong Eurosceptic, populist movements across Europe, what lesson should the EU take from its dealings with Orbán?

Orbán’s defeat after sixteen years shows that even leaders who have systematically weakened democratic institutions and rigged the system in their favour can lose at the ballot box. That alone sends an important message, including for other countries in Europe.

However, we shouldn’t become complacent. Orbán has been ousted, and other illiberal forces in the EU that have been acting in his wake might have been weakened by his defeat, but elections in major member states such as France and Poland are looming next year. And the threat of far-right, Eurosceptic parties coming into power is a real possibility.

The main lesson for the EU is clear: it needs to react much earlier to illiberal and authoritarian tendencies in its member states than it has in the past. In Hungary, the erosion of democracy went on for too long before the EU acted. Once democratic backsliding becomes deeply embedded, reversing it becomes extremely difficult. That is something we have seen in Poland and, in all likelihood, will see in Hungary. The EU should intervene at the first signs of trouble – not years later when the system has already been reshaped.

Dr Nguyen also commented on the Hungarian elections in Tagesschau  (in German).

Dr Thu Nguyen is Acting Co-Director of the Jacques Delors Centre. She leads the think tank’s work on institutional questions of EU policy. In her own work, she mainly focusses on EU institutional reform, rule of law, democracy and economic governance. 

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